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FOLLOWING A THREE-YEAR FLURRY OF DECISIONS interpreting the land-
mark 1994 ruling in Dolan v. City of Tigard, 1 recent cases interpreting 
the Supreme Court's "rough proportionality" test are harder to find 
than Waldo®. 2 Among decisions through the first quarter of 1998, there 
are no interpretations of Dolan's requirement of an approximate mathe-
matical correlation between a development exaction and the impact of 
development. Beyond dicta from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit, 3 there is also little evidence of an advance in the Califor-
l. 512 U.S. 374 (1994). For discussion of Dolan and subsequent federal and 
state case law, see generally Jonathan Davidson & Adam U. Lindgren, Nollan/Dolan, 
Show Me the Findings!, 29 URB. LAW .. 427 (1997); Daniel J. Curtin, Jr., Jonathan 
M. Davidson & Adam U. Lindgren, Nollan/Dolan: The Emerging Wing in Regulatory 
Takings Analysis, 28 URB. LAW .. 789 (1996); and Daniel J. Curtin, Jr. & Jonathan 
M. Davidson, Life After Dolan: Review of the Cases, 27 URB. LAw .. 874 (1995). 
2. This is a reference to the popular comic and puzzles, Where's Waldo®?, created 
by Martin Handford. 
3. See Richardson v. City and County of Honolulu, 124 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 
1997), discussed infra at notes 62 to 66 and accompanying text. 
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nia/ Arizona view that legislatively adopted exactions programs fall 
beyond the reach of this test. Rather, cases over the past year are 
most notable for drawing distinctions from Dolan's factual and legal 
applicability. Amid the unanticipated litigation lull, this annual report 
reflects on the current state of exactions case law and considers the 
potential impact of federal constitutional developments on local ordi-
nance drafting. 
I. Post-Dolan Exactions Law: A Roughly 
Proportional Status Report 
When Dolan v. City of Tigard first added the as-applied element to 
the ''nexus'' requirement established by Nollan v. California Coastal 
Commission, 4 litigators and commentators5 struggled to decipher when, 
where, and how the rough proportionality test would apply. The 1987 
Nollan decision established that there must be a linkage between a 
development exaction and a legitimate state interest. 6 Once this Nollan 
''nexus'' test is met, Dolan brought on a second tier of inquiry in 
1994: the relationship between specific land-use permit conditions and 
anticipated impacts of the proposed development requiring that this 
correlation reflect a measure of intensity that is roughly proportional. 7 
Prior to this year's pause in reported cases, courts have applied Dolan 's 
standard of rough proportionality with varied levels of scrutiny. Geor-
gia's determination that the test does not apply to landscaping require-
ments for parking lots was denied certiorari by the U.S. Supreme 
Court. 8 Prevalently, courts invoking the test have deferred to local 
planning analysis and findings provided there is evidence of supporting 
analysis and individualized findings. 9 A more inventive interpretation 
4. 483 u.s. 825 (1987). 
5. See, e.g., DavidS. Ardia, Dolan v. City of Tigard: Takings Doctrine Moves 
Onto Unpaved Ground, 24 REAL EsT. L.J. 195 (1996); John Delaney, What Does It 
Take to Make a Take? A Post-Dolan Look at the Evolution of Regulatory Takings 
Jurisprudence in the Supreme Court, 27 URB. LAw .. 55, 69 (1995); James H. Freis, 
Jr. & Stefan V. Reyniak, Putting Takings Back into the Fifth Amendment: Land Use 
Planning After Dolan v. City of Tigard, 21 CoLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 103 (1996); Nancy 
E. Stroud & Susan L. Trevarthen, Defensible Exactions After Nollan v. California 
Coastal Comm'n and Dolan v. City of Tigard, 25 STETSON L. REv. 593 (1996); Daniel 
A. Crane, Comment, A Poor Relation? Regulatory Takings After Dolan v. City of 
Tigard, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 199 (1996). 
6. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837. 
7. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391, 114 S. Ct. at 2319. 
8. See Parking Ass'n of Georgia, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 450 S. E.2d 200 (Ga. 
1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2268 (1995) (ordinance with specific landscaping 
requirements for parking lots not subject to review under the "rough proportionality" 
test of Dolan). 
9. See, e.g., F & W Assocs. v. County of Somerset, 648 A.2d 482, 487 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994) (nexus for road improvements exaction need not be mathe-
matically precise); Grogan v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 633 N.Y.S.2d 809, 810-11 
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of rough proportionality is evidenced in the Illinois appellate decision 
in Amoco Oil Company v. Village of Schaumberg. 10 That decision re-
versed a conditional rezoning after intensive scrutiny of local planning 
and engineering reports. 11 The Oregon appellate court in Art Piculell 
Group v. Clackamas County12 went so far as to overturn the local 
hearing officer's specific fact-finding on the location of water, sewage, 
and drainage pipes as part of its rough proportionality inquiry into road 
dedication conditions attached to subdivision approval. 13 
Federal and state judiciaries have also grappled with questions of the 
timing and applicability of the Dolan test. Clearly, the factual context of 
Dolan would make conditions attached to individual land development 
permits within its purview. 14 The rough proportionality test has also 
been applied to dedications and exactions linked to subdivision approv-
als, 15 rezoning, 16 and annexation. 17 Outside the direct land-use context, 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1995) (deferring to town's individualized determination in sustaining 
a scenic and conservation easement's purposes and application); Sparks v. Douglas 
County, 904 P.2d 738, 746 (Wash. 1995), rev'g, Sparks v. Douglas County, 863 
P.2d 142 (Wash. App. 1993) (sustaining required dedication of rights-of-way for road 
improvements where county had documented existing road deficiencies and had calcu-
lated increase in traffic and the specific need for dedications based upon impacts of 
the proposed subdivisions). 
10. 661 N.E.2d 380, 382-84 (Ill. App. 1995). While Illinois has a long-established 
test for exactions requiring that the impacts be specifically and uniquely attributable 
to the exaction, see Pioneer Trust & Sav. Bank v. Mt. Prospect, 176 N. E. 2d 799 
(Ill. 1961), the Schaumberg court clarified that it was deciding this matter under the 
Dolan rough proportionality test for federal constitutionality. 661 N.E.2d at 387, 
n. 5. 
11. Schaumberg, 661 N .E.2d at 392-93. The invalidated conditions required dedi-
cation of approximately 20% of the property for road improvements to reconstruct a 
convenience store with gas pumps. /d. 
12. 922 P.2d 1227 (Or. App. 1996). 
13. Clackamas County, 922 P.2d at 1234. This decision stated that "a single 
erroneous finding that plays a significant role in the government's effort to show rough 
proportionality can in itself be the basis for reversing the government decision." /d. 
at 1233. See also Goss v. City of Little Rock, 90 F.3d 306, 310 (8th Cir. 1996) 
(city's conditional rezoning requiring land dedication for expansion of adjacent highway 
remanded in light of "sparsity of the record"). 
14. Dolan involved conditions placed on a development permit for expansion of 
a hardware store including required dedications for a bikepath and flood way. Dolan, 
512 U.S. at 377-82; cf Clajon Prod. Corp. v. Petera, 70 F.3d 1566, 1578 (lOth Cir. 
1995) (Wyoming wildlife management law limiting number of hunting licenses that 
landowners could obtain for certain species distinguished Dolan as physical invasion 
case). 
15. See, e.g., Art Piculell Group v. Clackamas County, 922 P.2d 1227 (Or. App. 
1996); Sparks v. Douglas County, 904 P.2d 738, 746 (Wash. 1995) (subdivision plat 
approval); Hoepker v. City of Madison Plan Comm'n, 563 N.W.2d 145 (Wis. 1997) 
(subdivision conditions). 
16. See, e.g., Goss v. City of Little Rock, 90 F.3d 306 (8th Cir. 1996) (conditions 
attached to rezoning); Amoco Oil Co. v. Village of Schaumberg, 661 N.E.2d 380 
(Ill. App. 1995) (conditions attached to a zoning application for a special use permit). 
17. See Hoepker, 563 N .W.2d at 15l(invalidating subdivision condition requiring 
municipal annexation). 
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courts have considered the applicability of the test to housing preserva-
tion programs18 and to the support of public art. 19 
Substantial precedent also indicates that a legislative enactment im-
posing developer exactions may shield government from a Dolan-based 
attack. 20 However, this legislative armor may be pierced once the exac-
tion is administered on a case-by-case basis. In Ehrlich v. City of Culver 
City/ 1 the California Supreme Court found Dolan inapplicable to a 
generally applicable public art fee, 22 then invoked the rough proportion-
ality test for a recreational impact fee as applied to a single property. 
It then remanded that matter because that record was devoid of any 
individualized findings. 23 The Arizona Scottsdale decision also distin-
guished Dolan when it sustained an ordinance adopting a water service 
fee applicable to all new development at the building permit stage. 24 
It is notable, though, that the Arizona court devoted a substantial portion 
of its opinion to referencing supporting studies that addressed water 
resource needs, methodologies for calculating fees, and the comprehen-
sive program that led to enactment of the fee. 25 
Responding to another potential extension of Dolan's impact, the 
Washington State Supreme Court recently rejected a substantive due 
process argument that the adjudicatory nature of environmental permit 
issuance makes the rough proportionality takings test applicable. 26 In 
particular, the court concluded that the holding in Dolan which required 
shifting the burden of proof to the government to justify an exaction 
18. See, e.g., Lambert v. City and County of San Francisco, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
562 (Cal. App. 1997); Arcadia Dev. v. City ofB1oomington, 552 N.W. 2d 281, 286 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1996) (Dolan inapplicable to local ordinance requiring mobile home 
park owners to pay relocation costs to displaced residents upon closing of the park); 
Sintra, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 935 P.2d 555 (Wash. 1997) (concurring and dissenting 
opinions). 
19. Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 429 (Cal. 1996). 
20. See Homebuilders Ass'n v. City of Scottsdale, 930 P.2d 993, 1000 (Ariz. 
1997) (Dolan does not apply to water service fee ordinance); Ehrlich v. City of Culver 
City, 911 P.2d 429 (Cal. 1996) (distinguishing recreation and public art fee ordinance 
provisions from as-applied context); McCarthy v. City of Leawood, 894 P .2d 836, 845 
(Kan. 1995) (holding Dolan inapplicable to a municipal ordinance which conditioned 
building permits and plat approval on payment of impact fees); Waters Landing L.P. 
v. Montgomery County, 650 A.2d 712, 724 (Md. 1995) (distinguishing Dolan in part 
because development impact tax was legislative act). 
21. 911 P.2d 429 (Cal. 1996). 
22. Ehrlich, 911 P.2d at 450. 
23. /d. at 448. 
24. City of Scottsdale, 930 P.2d at 995. 
25. /d. at 997-1000. 
26. Christianson v. Snohomish Health Dist., 946 P.2d 768, 769-70 (Wash. 1997), 
concerned the denial of an environmental construction clearance permit for expansion 
of a mountain cabin based on the adequacy of a septic system. 
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did not automatically apply to other land-use adjudications. 27 The record 
before the court reflected an extensive inquiry into applicable state 
environmental regulations by the hearing examiner. 28 The Washington 
court distinguished between substantive due process and takings law. 
Here, the appellants did not argue that a property interest was deprived. 
Moving on to substantive due process, the court found that the govern-
ment purposes in the prevention of contamination of ground and surface 
water quality if the substandard septic system were approved, were 
adequate to meet this latter constitutional standard. 29 
II. Regulatory Leveraging in the Land 
Development Context: "I'm Not Dolan!" 
Concern with governmental regulatory leveraging, consistent with di-
rectives of Nollan and Dolan, has been a focus of recent cases before 
the Wisconsin and New Jersey Supreme Courts. Both cases involved 
the constitutionality of conditions imposed on developmental approval 
and addressed the fairness of allocating general community costs on 
land developers and, consequently, newcomers to the locality. 30 Other 
state and federal decisions involving subdivision approval conditions 
in Washington indicate greater deference to governmental discretion. 
However, none of these cases directly applies the rough proportionality 
element of Dolan's constitutional test. 
In Hoepker v. City of Madison Plan Commission/ 1 the Supreme 
Court of Wisconsin considered the case of a sixty-two-unit residential 
subdivision approval made subject to a series of conditions imposed 
by the City of Madison. The landowners, the Hoepkers, sought review 
on two of the conditions which required them: (1) to agree to a city 
annexation of the land covered by the preliminary subdivision plat and 
(2) to reconfigure their plat in order to provide for an open space 
corridor. The lower Wisconsin courts had ruled that the city could not 
condition plat approval on annexation, but that it could impose the open 
27. ld. at 774. 
28. ld. at771-72. 
29. /d. at 777. 
30. These decisions extend a theme present in constitutional theory at least since 
Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960), that the Takings Clause "was 
designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens 
which, in all fairness, and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.'' Imbedded 
within this line of thought is an opposition, on constitutional terms, to "regulatory 
leveraging" where government approval mechanisms are used to extort community 
benefits from individual land owners. 
31. City of Madison, 563 N.W.2d at 145. 
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space corridor condition. However, the state's supreme court took a 
different view. 
On the first question, the City of Madison court held that the city 
could not condition its subdivision plat approval on the annexation of 
the parcel. The city had justified this requirement to ensure that the 
full range of urban services could be provided to the development 
in a timely fashion according to the city's "established regulations, 
practices, policies, and procedures.' '32 While acknowledging the im-
portant public policy reasons for permitting development approval 
based, in part, on agreement to annexation, the court rejected this 
ground based on the inconsistency of the local requirement with state 
annexation policy and standards set forth in Wisconsin statutes. 33 There-
after, subdividers and localities may agree to annexation prior to the 
granting of development approval, but that agreement must be volun-
tary.34 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court considered next whether the city's 
requiring an open space corridor be identified on the subdivision plat 
and reserved for possible public acquisition for up to five years could 
be a potential "temporary regulatory taking." The lower appellate 
court had ruled that the Dolan precedent did not apply to the facts at 
hand, because Dolan involved conditional development approval based 
on the donation of land as opposed to the reservation of land in this 
case.35 In Madison, the owner was only required to delay use of the 
land rather than convey it to the locality. 36 The Wisconsin Supreme 
Court did not rely on this distinction in disposing of this issue. Rather, 
the court determined that the plaintiff's taking claim was not yet ''ripe'' 
for decision since there was no final location of the open space corridor 
and, therefore, no exact knowledge of regulatory impact on the land-
owner.37 
While there has been no judgment on the merits, the Madison decision 
is significant for raising the possibility that a condition imposing a 
reservation or delay on the development of land could constitute a 
taking even if for a temporary period. The Wisconsin court has merged 
the ideas contained in the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in First En-
glish Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles38 with 
32. !d. at 148. 
33. !d. at 151. 
34. !d. 
35. !d. at 149. 
36. City of Madison, 563 N.W.2d at 149. 
37. !d. at 153. 
38. 482 u.s. 304 (1987). 
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those in the Nollan and Dolan series of cases. City of Madison also 
indicates that the wide use of the long-term reservation technique may 
soon become the focus oflater cases. The fact that the local government 
might eventually pay compensation for the open space corridor might 
not save the reservation. However, significant analytical questions re-
main to be resolved in deciding such issues, including: what is the 
relevant property interest being taken in the temporary taking situation; 
what is the spillover effect of delaying development of the protected 
parcel to the remaining land; and how would the ''rough proportional-
ity" calculation of Dolan be applied in the temporary taking context? 
In the New Jersey Supreme Court case of Swanson v. Planning 
Board of the Township of Hopewel/, 39 a concurring opinion expresses 
particular concern that the unrestricted imposition of exactions would 
convert community planning into a nontransparent, case-by-case series 
of freewheeling municipal/landowner deals. The Hopewell dispute 
arose from the familiar setting of the conditional rezoning process where 
a land developer sought a rezoning to allow a residential subdivision. 
Negotiations between the land developer and the locality resulted in 
an agreement where the landowner promised to pay up to $1.7 million 
for the construction of a sewer pumping station and force main which 
would serve not only the subdivider's 117 acre parcel but also the 121 
existing homes in the adjacent Princeton Farms development. 40 The 
legal challenge presented in this case originated from a citizen's attack 
on the lawfulness of the subdivision approval pursuant to the earlier 
agreement. 41 
A concurring opinion by Judge Stein agreed with the court's refusal 
to hear the matter, but added a strong statement supporting exaction 
proportionality in the interest of preserving the integrity of public land 
planning and regulatory processes. The concurrence framed the issue 
as one of municipal authority: was this an illegal exaction unauthorized 
by the laws of the state of New Jersey? The three justice opinion con-
cluded that neither the New Jersey Municipal Land Use Law nor the 
local-improvements statute would have justified the imposition of dis-
proportionate sewer improvement costs upon the land developer. 42 
Although never explicitly mentioning either the Nollan or the Dolan 
39. Hopewell, 692 A.2d 966 (1997). 
40. Hopewell, 692 A.2d at 967. This agreement contained many provisions favor-
able to the developer's interest including a special provision immunizing the proposed 
residential subdivision against future, otherwise applicable, changes in the existing 
zoning ordinance design standards. /d. 
41. /d. at 967. 
42. /d. at 968. 
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opinions, the New Jersey opinion emphasized that a subdivider could 
only be compelled to supply the portion of an off-site improvement 
cost which bears a rational nexus to the needs created by, and benefits 
conferred upon, the subdivision. It then emphasized the need for pre-
dictability and judicial reviewability of exactions noting that the legisla-
ture had acted to ''circumscribe the power of planning boards by requir-
ing that the power be exercised in conformity with standards set forth 
by ordinance. " 43 The danger addressed by the court was not that unfair 
exactions would be imposed on reluctant land developers, but rather 
that local officials would have ''an impermissibly broad range of discre-
tion in exacting off-site improvements.' '44 That is, municipal discretion 
could be exercised in favor of property owners and developers willing 
to subject themselves to monetary or land exactions. 
This curious flip-side of the usual exaction case presents argument 
for uniformity and limits as a means of regulating local government 
dealmaking. As the opinion in Hopewell noted, 
... the kind of free-wheeling bidding under review is grossly inimical to the goals 
of sound land use regulation. The intolerable spectacle of a planning board haggling 
with an applicant over money too strongly suggests that variances are up for sale. 
This cannot be countenanced. Proceedings in which this has occurred are irremedia-
bly tainted and must be set aside.45 
The views expressed in the Hopewell concurrence portray exactions, 
even if acquiesced to, as improper incentives impermissibly tainting 
municipal actions on development applications. 
In comparative deference to local discretion, an intermediate Wash-
ington appellate decision, Snider v. Board, 46 focused on a condition 
for approval of a subdivision plat that would require government acqui-
sition of a right-of-way from a third party rather than from the principal 
property. 47 The court distinguished the factual context from Dolan be-
cause this contingency would require Walla Walia County to indepen-
dently initiate eminent domain proceedings apart from its subdivision 
control powers. 48 Here, Mr. Snider could not point to a direct infringe-
ment on his property as a basis for a takings claim. 49 
In Macri v. King County, 50 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals de-
43. /d. at 970. 
44. Hopewell, 692 A.2d at 970. 
45. /d. 
46. Snider v. Board, 932 P.2d 704 (Wash. App. 1997). 
47. /d. at 708-09. 
48. /d. at 709. 
49. /d. at 708. 
50. 126 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 1997). 
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ferred to Washington State compensatory remedies in its dismissal of 
a § 1983 action. In that case, the county had denied a preliminary plat 
application because of inadequate access to the proposed eleven-unit 
cul-de-sac subdivision. Ironically, the county hearing examiner's rec-
ommendation that was adopted relied on a general county ordinance 
allowing denial of an application if provision is not made for ''the public 
health, safety, and welfare," and rejected the planning department's 
"informal 'rule of thumb' to generally limit the number of lots which 
could be developed in an area with only one access road. " 51 
III. Dolan and Housing Conversion Programs-
More Exceptions to the Rule 
Recent discussions of the applicability of the constitutional rough pro-
portionality test focus on monetary exactions and compensation issues 
in relation to housing programs. In Lambert v. City and County of San 
Francisco, 52 the California intermediate appellate court averted Dolan 
in reviewing provisions designed to protect existing residential hotel 
units from conversion into more profitable tourist units. Following the 
required San Francisco zoning procedures, owners of the Cornell Hotel 
applied to the city's Planning Commission for a conditional use permit 
to undertake a conversion of its residential units. 53 The Commission 
denied the permit, finding that the proposed use was neither desirable 
nor necessary, would be injurious to personal and property interests 
in the neighborhood and the community, and would be inconsistent 
with the policies and objectives of the city's Master Plan. This denial 
resulted in the lawsuit challenging the city's action on the permit. 
The California Court of Appeal analyzed the case from two perspec-
tives. First, it concluded that neither the San Francisco Planning Code 
nor the HCO effected a taking of property either on their face or as 
applied to the specific elements of the Lambert case. In general, the 
fact that the regulations furthered legitimate governmental interests and 
did not deprive landowners of the economically viable use of their 
51. Macri, 126F.3dat 1127. 
52. 57 Cal. App. 4th 1172, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d 562 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997). 
53. At the outset the hotel contained 24 residential units and 34 tourist units. Under 
relevant code provisions, a hotel owner desiring to convert existing residential hotel 
units to tourist units must obtain both a conditional use permit under the planning 
code and permission under San Francisco's Hotel Conversion Ordinance (HCO). City 
permission to convert the units may be given only if the owner replaces the units or 
agrees to pay the costs of constructing similar units. This latter requirement demanded 
a one-to-one replacement for each converted unit. Lambert, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 565, 
57 Cal. App. 4th at 1175. 
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property convinced the court to sustain the local government rules. 
Along the same lines, the appellate panel ruled that the denial of the 
conditional use permit did not constitute a taking either because Lambert 
was attempting to secure approval to change the land use of the parcel, 
and, therefore, had no property right to the requested change. In addi-
tion, the court found substantial evidence supporting the city's position 
involving issues of affordable housing preservation, prevention of traf-
fic congestion, and limited parking. These and other reasons justified 
denial of the permit since they furthered legitimate governmental inter-
ests. 54 
The appellate court sidestepped Lambert's central evidentiary con-
tention that the City Planning Commission would have issued the condi-
tional use permit if he had paid the city $600,000, representing the 
cost of rebuilding an equal number of housing units being removed by 
way of the hotel conversion. For hotel conversions, this one-to-one 
replacement feature was imposed pursuant to the HCO and constituted 
a prerequisite to the issuance of the conditional use permit. 55 Apparently 
the court was aware of the troublesome constitutional character of the 
housing replacement charge, but it chose to avoid the question by focus-
ing upon the legitimate grounds for denying the conditional use permit. 
While the California court recognized that the Nollan/Dolan line of 
cases required a heightened standard of review, it concluded that such 
scrutiny was not demanded in the case before it. Since Lambert's condi-
tional use permit request was turned down solely on the basis of' 'legiti-
mate'' local government planning factors, the court reasoned that it need 
not consider the case under the Nollan/Dolan or Ehrlich constitutional 
principles. A strongly worded dissenting opinion would have applied 
the analysis from these case decisions and would have found for the 
Lamberts. 56 
The Lambert case represents an example of a court straining to avoid 
considering the city's housing replacement policy in terms of a develop-
ment condition or an exaction. The court even revealed a degree of 
discomfort with its own position when it stated that, 
[w]hile it is somewhat disturbing that San Francisco's concerns about congestion, 
parking and preservation of a neighborhood might have been overcome by payment 
of significant sum of money, the fact remains that San Francisco did not demand 
54. /d. at567-72. 
55. /d. at 572. 
56. /d. at 573. 
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anything from Lambert as a condition of a use permit. It simply denied the permit 
outright. 57 
This statement suggests a significant degree of inconsistency in the 
court's holding-while it approved of the permit denial based on legiti-
mate governmental concerns, it saw the city willing to waive those 
important considerations upon the payment of a substantial fee. Such 
a waivable policy induces skepticism about the reality of the suggested 
public purposes supposedly being advanced by the ordinance. The deci-
sion ignores the explicit HCO one-to-one replacement requirement and 
refuses to apply the prevailing and applicable constitutional analysis 
to it. Such an unwillingness would seem to indicate a lack of confidence 
in the constitutionality of the provision. With review granted by the 
California Supreme Court, these issues are likely to be resolved. 
An analogous debate between concurring and dissenting Washington 
State Supreme Court justices transpired over whether Dolan's rough 
proportionality test should be applied to Seattle's rescinded Housing 
Preservation Ordinance. The majority opinion in Sintra, Inc. v. City 
ofSeattle58 rested on the issue of the applicability of interest and punitive 
damage awards under Seattle's former Housing Preservation Ordi-
nance.59 However, a concurring opinion by Chief Judge Durham60 took 
specific issue with a dissent by Judge Talmadge, who would apply 
Dolan to the monetary damage measure of the ordinance's impact on 
the property owner. 61 
A federal Ninth Circuit ruling also rejected the applicability of Do-
lan's heightened scrutiny to an ordinance providing for conversion of 
leasehold interests in condominium units into fee interests. Richardson 
v. City and County of Honolulu62 addressed this unique law and regula-
tions, which offered eminent domain compensation for affected prop-
erty owners. The federal appellate court rejected the argument that the 
ordinance should be subject to the rough proportionality test. 63 
The majority decision in Honolulu distinguished the ordinance at 
issue, which incorporated an eminent domain procedure to compensate 
landowners affected by the condominium conversions, from a regula-
57. /d. at 569. 
58. 935 P.2d 555 (Wash. 1997). 
59. /d. at 558. 
60. /d. at 570-74 (Durham, C.J., concurring). 
61. /d. at 578-82 (Talmadge, J., dissenting in part). 
62. 124 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 1997). 
63. Richardson, 124 F.3d at 1153. 
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tory takings context where compensation is not anticipated.64 It deter-
mined that continued deference to legislative enactment, as affirmed 
in Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 65 remains the applicable law. 66 
IV. Dolan's Impact on Drafting Local 
Exaction and Impact Fee Ordinances: 
A Public Agency Practical Perspective 
One major lesson derived from Nollan!Dolan and their decisional prog-
eny is that public agencies, particularly cities and counties, 67 must draft 
with greater care local ordinances that impose exactions and develop-
ment impact fees. 68 Adequate comprehensive plans69 and capital im-
64. /d. at 1157-58. 
65. 467 u.s. 229 (1984). 
66. Richardson, 124 F. 3d at 1157-60. A dissenting opinion suggests that the Lucas-
Nolan-Dolan trio should be extended to allow heightened scrutiny of compensatory 
regulation ordinances. /d. at 1166-68 (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting in part). 
67. Although Nollan involved the imposition of an exaction (access easement dedi-
cation) by a state agency, the preponderance of case law in this constitutional fray 
embraces legislative and adjudicative action taken by cities and counties. For back-
ground, see J. KUSHNER, SUBDIVISION LAW AND GROWTH MANAGEMENT § 6.08 
(1997). 
68. For acknowledgment of this view from public and private sector quarters, see 
Daniel J. Curtin, Jr., Takings in the Land-Use Arena after Lucas and Dolan: How 
Far Is Too Far in Imposing Exactions?, in TAKINGS-LAND-DEVELOPMENT CoNDI-
TIONS AND REGULATORY TAKINGS AITER DOLAN AND LUCAS 83, 103 (D. Callies, 
ed. 1996) (public sector view); and Bley, Dolan: Ramifications for Developers, 4 
CAL. LAND UsE & ENV'T FoRUM 85, 88 (Spring 1995) (private sector view). From 
a state statutory perspective, Arizona expressly requires cities, towns and counties to 
comply with the Nollan/Dolan cases, see 3A ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN.§§ 9-500.13, 
11-810 (West Supp. 1997). Regulatory takings in the Nollan/Dolan area are classified 
as a "title take," as opposed to a "physical occupation take" or an "economic take." 
For discussion of this doctrinal classification of regulatory takings, see Robert H. 
Freilich & Elizabeth Garvin, Takings after Lucas: Growth Management, Planning, 
and Regulatory Implementation Will Work Better Than Before, in AITER LucAs: 
LAND USE REGULATION AND THE TAKING OF PROPERTY WITHOUT COMPENSATION 
53, 54-61 (D. Callies, ed. 1993) (defining a "title take" as "a restriction on the use 
of property that significantly interferes with the incidents of ownership"; a "physical 
take'' as ''a physical occupation authorized by government''; and an ''economic take'' 
as "the failure of a regulation to advance a legitimate state interest [or] the absence 
of any permanent [economic] value remaining for the property taken as a whole"). 
A "title take" has a better chance of being recognized in court because of the compara-
tively stricter constitutional standards with which public agencies must comply to 
survive a ''title take.'' See generally John J. Delaney, What Does It Take to Make a 
Take? A Post-Dolan Look at the Evolution of Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence in the 
Supreme Court, 27 URB. LAW. 55, 69 (1995) (arguing that regulatory exactions (e.g., 
conveyance/dedication of property and development impact fees) will be subjected to 
"higher than minimal scrutiny, with the burden of proof being upon the government 
instead of the property owner"). 
69. See Robert H. Freilich & David W. Bushek, Public Improvements and the 
Nexus Factor: The Takings Equation after Dolan v. City of Tigard, in EXACTIONS, 
IMPACT FEES AND DEDICATIONS 3, 13-14 (R. Freilich & D. Bushekeds., 1995) [herein-
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provement programs70 can be viewed as twin pillars of a rationally 
based exaction and impact fee ordinance. The absence of either or both 
of these bases can expose the ordinance itself, or its implementation 
for a site-specific development project, to a Nollan/Dolan constitutional 
attack. 71 
Consequently, in a figurative sense, public agencies can obtain sub-
stantial constitutional insurance by taking the time to pay the premiums 
for adequate land-use, environmental, and engineering planning that 
documents the public needs and impacts that are intended to be 
addressed by a local exaction and impact fee ordinance. 72 In this way, 
defenders of an ordinance or development decision can refer the court 
to the planning and programming studies that provide the extended 
rationale for the imposition of exactions and impact fees. 
In connection with preparing an exaction or impact fee ordinance, 73 
the drafter should ( 1) identify the purpose of the exaction/impact fee; 
(2) demonstrate a reasonable relationship between the exaction/impact 
after "EXACTIONS") and Davidson, Concurrency, Cost Allocation, and Comprehen-
siveness in Adequate Public Facilities Regulations, in 1992 ZoNING & PLANNING LAw 
HANDBOOK 283, 292-99 (K. Young ed.). 
70. See Morgan, Duncan, McClendon & Standerfer, Impact Fee Ordinances: A 
Guide to Legal Requirements and Administrative Standards, in 1987 ZONING & PLAN-
NING LAW HANDBOOK 275, 293-302 (N. Gordon ed.). 
71. Likely grounds for challenge include that there is no rational basis for the 
ordinance or there is no reasonable relationship (essential nexus) between the project 
condition (exaction/impact fee) and the impact to be mitigated by that condition. 
72. Robert H. Freilich & Terry D. Morgan, Municipal Strategies for Imposing 
Valid Development Exactions: Responding to Nollan, in EXACTIONS, supra note 69, 
at 21, 27-31. 
73. As a practical matter, the drafter of the local exaction/impact fee legislation 
must come to grips with certain fundamentals, which include, but are not limited to, 
the following: 
SECTION 1, Exaction/Impact Fee Ordinance (Short Title, Findings, Intent, Authority, 
Definitions, Applicability of Exaction/Impact Fee, Imposition of Exaction/Impact 
Fee, Establishment of Development Subareas, Development Potential by Subarea, 
Capital Improvement Program by Subarea, Impact Fee Coefficients by Subarea, 
Administration of Exaction/Impact Fee, Bonding of Excess Facility Project, Re-
funds, Appeals, Effect of Exaction/Impact Fee on Zoning and Subdivision Regula-
tions, Exaction/Impact Fee as Additional and Supplemental Requirement, Variances 
and Exceptions, and Credits); 
SECTION 2, Liberal Construction; 
SECTION 3, Repealer; 
SECTION 4, Severability; and 
SECTION 5, Effective Date. 
For an excellent discussion of this type of ordinance, see Leitner & Strauss, A Municipal 
Impact Fee Ordinance, Based on the Standard Development Impact Fee Enabling 
Statute, with Commentary, in DEVELOPMENT IMPACT FEES: POLICY RATIONALE, PRAC-
TICE, THEORY & IssuEs 142 (A. Nelson ed., 1988). See also Martin L. Leitner & 
Susan P. Shoettle, A Survey of State Impact Fee Enabling Legislation, 25 URB. LAW. 
491 (1993). 
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fee and the purpose for which it is imposed; (3) identify all sources 
and amounts of funding anticipated to complete financing of incomplete 
public improvements; (4) designate the approximate dates on which 
such funds are expected to be deposited into the appropriate fund or 
account; and (5) direct that such funds be deposited into a separate 
account for the identified impact fee. 74 
When drafting the legislative findings demonstrating the reasonable 
relationship between exaction/impact fee and the purpose for which it 
is imposed, it is critical that the findings not be conclusory. Instead, 
the findings should articulate specific facts that justify the need for the 
exaction or the impact fee and should refer to land-use, environmental, 
and engineering reports designed to document the justification for the 
exaction/impact fee. One should avoid the temptation to cluster the 
discussion of the reasonable relationship between the exaction/impact 
fee and the purpose for which it is charged with several different exac-
tions/impact fees. Isolate the findings discussion for each exaction/ 
impact fee. This will avoid confusion in the adoption process, as well 
as in the judicial process, if necessary .75 Finally, a public hearing, even 
if not mandatory before adoption, should be held to give reasonable 
notice and opportunity for community input to the proposed exaction/ 
impact fee ordinance. 
V. Reflections on the Current Quiet: 
Issues Resolved or Icebergs Ahead? 
In this smooth-sailing year, it may be prudent to survey explanations 
for the relative absence of reported cases addressing the scope and 
application of Nollan and Dolan's developing federal constitutional law 
of exactions. First, it is possible that few litigants are seeking to chal-
lenge municipal and other local government development exaction prac-
tices because they believe that those practices comply with the constitu-
tional parameters of the U.S. Supreme Court decisions and that legal 
attack would be costly and futile. Improved local government documen-
tation of the costs of development may also deter potential plaintiffs 
74. These components are derived from California legislation. See, e.g., CAL. 
Gov'T CoDE§§ 66000, et seq. (West 1997 & Supp. 1998). See also David L. Callies, 
Dolan v. City of Tigard: One Year Later, 4 CAL. LAND UsE & ENV'T FoRUM 79, 84 
(Spring 1995) (suggesting, in part, that local government must "develop defensible 
quantification measures" for the exactions imposed). For an example of state enabling 
legislation that shows how to quantify development impact fees, see Idaho Code §§ 
67-8201 et seq. (Michie Supp. 1997). 
75. For further discussion on drafting findings, see Michael C. Spata, Project 
Exactions and the Nollan Case, APA SAN DIEGO PLAN. J. 5, 6 (Feb. 1989). See also 
Jonathan M. Davidson & Adam U. Lindgren, Nollan/Dolan, Show Me the Findings!, 29 
URB. LAW. 427 (1997). 
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from challenging the governmental unit. If the amount of the exaction 
is relatively certain and underlying methodologies are clearly de-
marked, the regulated party may conclude that a challenge is not cost-
effective. Especially with regard to financial exactions, the incorpora-
tion of these costs into project sales prices might restrain the desire to 
litigate the constitutional validity of the exaction. 
In some jurisdictions, the absence of reported exaction cases might 
also herald the development of new governmental techniques achieving 
the same purposes as exactions. For instance, financial development 
charges may be characterized as excise taxes or privilege taxes. 76 Other 
localities may rely to a greater degree on the use of nonproperty transfer 
techniques such as setback and buffer zones to provide for land preserva-
tion and protection without a land exaction. 
Conversely, there may be a chilling effect on assertive or expansive 
exactions by governments wary of federal constitutional challenges. 
The prospect of defending a takings challenge based on alleged tempo-
rary or permanent infringements may lead to increased capitulation, 
or perhaps to a negotiated development that is more compromising 
than that initially proposed by planning staff. The element of state 
compensatory remedies, emboldened by the Dolan ruling, may also 
temper required dedications or monetary exaction demands. 
Finally, potential challengers could believe that although local gov-
ernment exaction methods violate the rules set out in the Nollan and 
Dolan cases, resorting to the state court remedies would be unproduc-
tive due to those courts' reluctance to interpret expansively the sweep 
of the cases. State courts may ignore federal constitutional holdings 
in their opinions and rely on state law principles to rule on the same 
issues. However, the Supreme Court's ruling in Suitum v. Tahoe Re-
gional Planning Agency77 does appear to establish federal grounds for 
ripeness of takings claims short of exhausting all local (or state) adminis-
trative remedies. Whether or not this ripeness portends impending ti-
tanic clashes over government exactions, it is logical to surveil the 
stillness in case law for timely detection of submerged issues. 78 
76. Telephone Interview with David W. Bushek, Attorney with Stinson, Mag, & 
Fizzell, Kansas City, Mo. (Apr. 21, 1998). 
77. 117 S. Ct. 1659 (1997) (holding that property owner did not need to exhaust 
remedies through transferable development rights program for takings claim to be 
ripe). 
78. See, e.g., Del Monte Dunes at Monterrey, Ltd. v. City of Monterrey, 95 F.3d 
1422, 1434-35 (9th Cir. 1996) (affirming district court jury verdict and temporary 
damage award of $1.450 million for extensive conditions placed on subdivision applica-
tion for 37.6 acres of oceanfront property), cen. granted, Monterrey v. Del Monte 
Dunes at Monterrey, Ltd., 60 U.S.L.W. 3635 (Mar. 31, 1998). 
